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STATE AND NON-STATE JUSTICE SYSTEMS IN 
AFGHANISTAN: THE NEED FOR SYNERGY 
ALI WARDAK* 
1. INTRODUCTION 
The long Afghan conflict has resulted in an extensive 
destruction of Afghanistan‘s state justice institutions that existed 
prior to the former Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (―USSR‖) 
invasion of the country in December 1979.  The destruction has not 
only included extensive damage to buildings, office furniture, 
official records, legal resources, and essential office equipment, but 
also the death, imprisonment, and migration of hundreds of 
professional justice officials, including qualified judges, 
prosecutors, police officers, and prison wardens.1  Following the 
collapse of the Taliban regime, the Bonn Agreement of December 
2001 authorized formation of the Afghanistan Judicial 
Commission.2  The Bonn Agreement tasked the Commission—with 
help from the United Nations and other international actors—to 
―rebuild the [Afghan] domestic justice system in accordance with 
Islamic principles, international standards, the rule of law and 
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Feinman, and the staffs of the Journal of International Law and the Journal of Law 
and Social Change at the University of Pennsylvania for their very 
helpful comments on earlier versions of the Article.  My heartfelt thanks go to my 
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of this Article was presented by the author at ―The Afghanisation 
Strategy,‖ a seminar organized by Casa Asia in Barcelona, Spain on June 15, 2009.   
1 Ali Wardak, Building a Post-War Justice System in Afghanistan, 41 J. CRIME L. 
& SOC. CHANGE 319, 328 (2004). 
2 See Agreement on Provisional Arrangements in Afghanistan Pending the 
Re-Establishment of Permanent Government Institutions, S.C. Res. 1383, U.N. 
SCOR, 4434th mtg., U.N. Doc. S/2001/1154 (Dec. 5, 2001), available at 
http://www.unhcr.org/refworld/docid/3f48f4754.html [hereinafter Bonn 
Agreement]. 
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Afghan legal traditions.‖3  The Commission, however, which lacked 
both vision and competence, had difficulty drawing up a roadmap 
for rebuilding the post-Taliban justice system and working 
collaboratively with permanent Afghan justice institutions.4  This 
situation has had important negative implications for the process of 
rebuilding a post-Taliban justice system in Afghanistan over the past 
ten years. 
Afghanistan‘s post-Taliban administrations, supported by, 
among others, the United Nations, Italy, the United States, 
Germany, and Canada, embarked on the complex task of 
rebuilding Afghanistan‘s rule of law and justice institutions.  The 
various national and international efforts in this process are guided 
by several strategies, which mainly include the 2008 Afghanistan 
National Development Strategy, the National Justice Sector Strategy, 
National Justice Program, and the 2010 Afghanistan National 
Development Strategy Prioritization and Implementation Plan.5  While 
overlapping, these strategies provide guidance to the Afghan 
government‘s rule of law and justice implementation program, as 
well a framework for international donor support.6  Key objectives of 
the Afghanistan National Development Strategy that were to be 
accomplished by the end of 2010 included completion of the basic 
legal framework (including civil, criminal, and commercial law), 
rehabilitation of the physical infrastructure of justice institutions, 
establishment of fully functional justice institutions throughout 
Afghanistan, review and reform of oversight of corruption-related 
procedures, addressing lack of due process and miscarriages of 
justice, and strengthening the professionalism, credibility, and 
integrity of the justice system personnel.7 
 
3 Id. at 4. 
4 See U.N. Secretary-General, The Situation in Afghanistan and Its Implications 
for International Peace and Security: Rep. of the Secretary-General, delivered to the 
Security Council, U.N. Doc. S/2003/1212 (Dec. 30, 2003); see also Wardak, supra 
note 1 (discussing the difficulties of working with Afghan institutions to establish 
a cohesive justice system). 
5 See generally LIANA SUN WYLER & KENNETH KATZMAN, CONG. RESEARCH 
SERV., R41484, AFGHANISTAN: U.S. RULE OF LAW AND JUSTICE SECTOR ASSISTANCE 
(2010) (explaining generally the international reform efforts in Afghanistan). 
6 Id. at 17. 
7 INT‘L MONETARY FUND, ISLAMIC REPUBLIC OF AFG.: AFGHANISTAN NATIONAL 
DEVELOPMENT STRATEGY: FIRST ANNUAL REPORT 1387 (2008/2009), MAKING A 
DIFFERENCE: TRANSITION FROM PLANNING TO PRACTICE 10 (2009), available at 
http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/scr/2009/cr09319.pdf [hereinafter 
AFGHANISTAN NATIONAL DEVELOPMENT STRATEGY]. 
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This Article argues that a post-Taliban justice system, built on a 
meaningful synergy between state and non-state justice 
institutions, has a very strong potential for providing accessible, 
effective, cost-effective and transparent justice to all sections of the 
Afghan society.  This Article is divided into three main sections.  
Section 2 examines the achievements as well as the problems that 
have surfaced throughout the process of rebuilding Afghanistan‘s 
state justice institutions over the past ten years.  Section 3 discusses 
non-state justice institutions, focusing on jirga and shura.  After 
examining positive aspects of jirga and shura, the negative aspects 
of these non-state institutions of local dispute settlement are 
highlighted.  In Section 4, this Article focuses on the ―hybrid model 
of Afghan justice,‖ which was proposed by the 2007 Afghanistan 
Human Development Report.8  The ―hybrid model‖ recommends the 
creation of meaningful institutional links between state and non-
state justice systems in Afghanistan.  The Article concludes that a 
meaningful synergy between state and non-state justice institutions 
has a strong potential to provide justice to all sections of Afghan 
society and to become a channel of communication among 
ordinary citizens and their state in post-Taliban Afghanistan. 
2. STATE JUSTICE SYSTEM 
Although it is difficult to draw a clear dividing line between 
state and non-state justice systems in Afghanistan, the former 
generally refers to positive law that functions through legal codes 
and state institutions, such as the courts, prosecutors, police, the 
prison service, and the bar of law.  Thus, in the context of 
Afghanistan, key state justice and judicial institutions include the 
Supreme Court (stara mahkama), the Attorney General‘s Office (loy 
saranwali), the police (sarandoi), the Ministry of Justice (wezarate-e-
adelia), and the prison service.  Although these institutions are 
supposed to be closely interconnected, in reality there exists little 
organic chain-like interaction among them, and therefore, they 
hardly operate as a ―system.‖9  Nevertheless, the totality of these 
 
8 CTR. FOR POLICY & HUMAN DEV., AFGHANISTAN HUMAN DEVELOPMENT 
REPORT, BRIDGING MODERNITY AND TRADITION: RULE OF LAW AND THE SEARCH FOR 
JUSTICE 4 (2007), available at http://hdr.undp.org/en/reports/nationalreports/ 
asiathepacific/afghanistan/nhdr2007.pdf [hereinafter AFGHANISTAN HUMAN 
DEVELOPMENT REPORT]. 
9 See Ali Wardak, Rule of Law in Afghanistan: An Overview, in 4 PETERSBERG 
PAPERS ON AFGHANISTAN AND THE REGION 47 (Wolfgang Danspeckgruber ed., 2009) 
(explaining the development of Afghan political and judicial institutions).  See 
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justice institutions has historically been referred to as a nezam-e-
adlee wa qazaiee (justice and judicial order/system), which was 
central to the maintenance of social and political order in pre-war 
Afghanistan. 
While progress in rebuilding the Afghan state justice system 
during the past ten years has been slow and patchy, it has 
nevertheless been noticeable: significant work has been done on 
legislation; several hundred judges, prosecutors, and prison 
wardens, and thousands of police personnel have been trained; 
some justice institutions have been refurbished; and several new 
ones have been built from scratch.10  Progress has also been made 
with regard to building administrative capacity within the existing 
justice institutions and the publication and distribution of a large 
body of law to legal professionals.11  Progress in rebuilding 
Afghanistan‘s state justice system has included the establishment 
of the Independent Bar Association of Afghanistan, legal aid 
departments in Kabul and in three provinces, the Independent 
National Legal Training Centre (―INLTC‖) in Kabul, and a 
committee for the simplification of judicial bureaucracy.12 
Moreover, there has been an agreement between the Attorney 
General and Ministry of Interior on the development and 
implementation of measures to improve prosecution processes, 
and the introduction of common telephone numbers for use by the 
public to register complaints.13 
However despite the above-mentioned achievements, the post-
Taliban state justice system is far from delivering justice to the 
Afghan people and faces serious problems.  The nature and 
severity of these problems appear to have heavily overshadowed 
what has been achieved thus far.  These problems include endemic 
corruption, high levels of professional incompetence, inadequacy 
of physical infrastructure such as courtrooms and 
detention/correctional facilities, very low levels of public trust, 
and the provision of minimal international funding for the 
 
generally AFGHANISTAN HUMAN DEVELOPMENT REPORT, supra note 8 (discussing 
generally the social developments in Afghanistan); CHRIS JOHNSON ET AL., 
AFGHANISTAN‘S POLITICAL AND CONSTITUTIONAL DEVELOPMENT (2003), available at 
http://www.odi.org.uk/resources/download/4810.pdf (discussing generally the 
lack of cohesiveness among Afghan institutions). 
10 See generally AFGHANISTAN NATIONAL DEVELOPMENT STRATEGY, supra note 8. 
11 Id. 
12 Id. at 33. 
13 Id. at 33. 
https://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/jil/vol32/iss5/5
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rebuilding of justice and rule of law institutions in post-Taliban 
Afghanistan.14  Due to the United States‘ overemphasis on the 
―War on Terror‖ in Afghanistan, the issue of rebuilding justice and 
rule of law institutions has, until recent years, been largely 
neglected.  According to Lakhdar Brahimi, ―[t]he international 
community, including the United Nations is just starting to pay 
enough attention to rule-of-law issues.  In Afghanistan, the judicial 
reform process was largely neglected, and I must confess that I 
personally bear a large part of responsibility for that.‖15  This 
observation, particularly the allocation of insufficient funds to 
reforming and rebuilding justice and rule of law institutions until 
recent years, is illustrated in Figure 1, below. 
FIGURE 1: U.S. CIVILIAN FUNDING FOR AFGHAN ROL ASSISTANCE FY 
2002 - FY 2010 AND FINANCIAL 2011 REQUEST16 
 
 
 
14 See generally STEPHEN CARTER & KATE CLARK, NO SHORTCUT TO STABILITY: 
JUSTICE, POLITICS, AND INSURGENCY IN AFGHANISTAN (2010), 
http://www.chathamhouse.org/sites/default/files/public/Research/Asia/1210
pr_afghanjustice.pdf (discussing the fundamental role of justice to stability in 
Afghanistan); WYLER & KATZMAN, supra note 5, at 5 (describing public perceptions 
of corruption in Afghanistan). 
15 LAKHDAR BRAHIMI, 7TH GLOBAL FORUM ON REINVENTING GOVERNMENT 
BUILDING TRUST IN GOVERNMENT, STATE BUILDING IN CRISIS AND POST-CONFLICT 
COUNTRIES 15 (2007), available at http://unpan1.un.org/intradoc/groups/ 
public/documents/un/unpan026305.pdf. 
16 WYLER & KATZMAN, Supra note 5, at 27. 
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Figure 1, above, indicates that assistance from the United States 
to Afghan justice and rule of law (―ROL‖) institutions for fiscal 
years 2007 and 2008 was only seven million and eight million 
dollars respectively; the total of this assistance from fiscal years 
2002 through 2007 did not exceed $160 million.  It was only from 
fiscal year 2008 on that there was a significant increase in assistance 
to Afghan justice and rule of law institutions, which peaked in 
2010.  Some of the problems that Afghanistan‘s justice system 
currently faces, particularly the lack of sufficient professional, 
human, and legal resources, inadequacy of physical infrastructure, 
and low salaries for justice officials, could be directly traced to the 
very low level of investment in this sector. 
Other than insufficient investment in the justice sector, national 
and international efforts have primarily focused on strengthening 
the pre-war state justice institutions in Afghanistan—they have 
mainly focused on patchy ―legal engineering‖ and quick fixes, and 
on meeting targets and the technical aspects of reform at the 
expense of its normative dimensions.17  Different donor countries 
concentrated on different aspects of the justice sector without 
effective coordination among them and with the Afghan state 
institutions.18  This situation also seems to have resulted in the 
continued absence of a coherent vision for rebuilding and 
reforming the justice sector in Afghanistan. The outcome has been 
a fragmented justice ―system,‖ the key components of which (the 
judiciary, police, prosecution, and prison service) do not operate as 
a system at all.19  All these problems, combined with a growing 
insurgency and persistent institutionalized corruption, have 
 
17 See generally Wardak, supra note 9, at 47 (explaining the development of 
Afghan political and judicial institutions); Astri Suhrke & Kaja Borchgrevink, 
Negotiating Justice Sector Reform in Afghanistan, 51 J. CRIME L. & SOC. CHANGE 211 
(2008) (discussing the post-2001 justice sector reforms in Afghanistan); CARTER & 
CLARK, supra note 14 (suggesting that aiming for rigid short-term solutions to 
problems plaguing Afghanistan‘s justice system will undermine its long-term 
stability). 
18 See generally AFGHANISTAN HUMAN DEVELOPMENT REPORT, supra note 8; 
Wardak, supra note 9 (detailing a lack of communication between Afghanistan 
and its international partners in redeveloping Afghanistan‘s justice system). 
19 See Wardak, supra note 9 (discussing the absence of a broader institutional 
framework to coordinate different parts of Afghanistan‘s developing justice 
system); see also JOHNSON ET AL., Supra note 9 (discussing generally the lack of 
cohesiveness among Afghan institutions).  See generally AFGHANISTAN HUMAN 
DEVELOPMENT REPORT, supra note 8. 
https://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/jil/vol32/iss5/5
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further complicated the task of rebuilding an effective justice 
system in post-Taliban Afghanistan. 
The most serious among the problems which Afghanistan‘s 
justice (and many other state) institutions face is corruption.  
Although corruption in the Afghan justice system is not a new 
phenomenon,20 recent studies reveal a much gloomier picture.  A 
2010 United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (―UNODC‖) 
survey reveals that in 2009, Afghans paid around $ 2.5 billion U.S. 
dollars in bribes—a figure equivalent to twenty-three percent of 
the Afghanistan‘s gross domestic product (―GDP‖).21  The survey, 
which is based on real experiences of Afghan men and women (in 
both urban and rural areas), reveals that judicial and criminal 
justice officials topped those public officials who took bribes 
during 2009.22  This picture is illustrated in Figure 2, below. 
FIGURE 2: PERCENTAGES OF ADULT POPULATION WHO PAID BRIBES 
AFTER CONTACT WITH SELECTED TYPES OF PUBLIC OFFICIALS, BY 
TYPE OF OFFICIAL AND URBAN/RURAL AREAS23 
 
20 AFGHANISTAN HUMAN DEVELOPMENT REPORT, supra note 8, at 60–64; see also 
Wardak, supra note 1 (discussing the history and development of corruption in the 
Afghan justice system). 
21 UNITED NATIONS OFFICE ON DRUGS AND CRIME, CORRUPTION IN 
AFGHANISTAN: BRIBERY AS REPORTED BY THE VICTIMS 25 (2010), available at 
http://www.unodc.org/documents/data-and-analysis/Afghanistan/ 
Afghanistan-corruption-survey2010-Eng.pdf. 
22 Id. 
23 Id. 
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Figure 2, above, reveals that urban area police officers, 
custom officers, judges, and municipal officials ranked highest 
(respectively) in the receipt of bribes.  And in rural areas, 
prosecutors, judges, custom officers, and police officers ranked 
highest (respectively) in the receipt of bribes.  What is important to 
notice is that, in both urban and rural areas, it is mainly judicial 
and criminal justice officials who are seen as the most corrupt 
public officials, and it is these same officials who are entrusted 
with upholding the law.  The 2010 Integrity Watch Afghanistan 
(―IWA‖) survey reached a very similar conclusion. 
The survey indicates that Afghans perceive the main 
institutions responsible for security and justice as the most 
corrupt.  42% of the respondents consider the Ministry of 
Interior to be the most corrupt, while the Ministry of Justice 
and the Directorate of National Security are perceived as 
the most corrupt by 32% and 30 %, respectively.  Moreover, 
households paid the highest numbers of bribes for the 
provision of security and justice by the police and the 
courts.24 
In response to endemic and widespread official corruption, the 
Afghan government—with the support of the international 
community—has devised various anti-corruption strategies and 
bodies during the past six years.  The most important of these is 
the creation of the High Office for Oversight for the 
Implementation of the Anti-Corruption Strategy in July 2008.25  The 
new body, which is referred to as the High Office for Oversight 
(―HOO‖), has devised an ambitious agenda for its activities.  To 
date, HOO and some key relevant ministries and state institutions 
have taken important practical steps in the right direction, 
including the simplification of bureaucratic systems in some 
government institutions, and the creation of a specialized anti-
corruption criminal unit.  While HOO and its initiatives appear 
promising, the January 2011 Special Inspector General for 
Afghanistan Reconstruction (―SIGAR‖) Report to the U.S. Congress 
 
24 INTEGRITY WATCH AFG., AFGHAN PERCEPTIONS AND EXPERIENCES OF 
CORRUPTION: A NATIONAL SURVEY 11 (2010), available at http://www.iwaweb.org/ 
Reports/PDF/IWA%20corruption% 20survey%202010.pdf. 
25 SPECIAL INSPECTOR GEN. FOR AFG. RECONSTR. (SIGAR), TENTH QUARTERLY 
REPORT TO THE UNITED STATES CONGRESS 108 (2011) [hereinafter SIGAR REPORT]. 
https://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/jil/vol32/iss5/5
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says that, ―[i]n an audit report released in December 2009, SIGAR 
found that the HOO suffered from a limited operational capacity.  
The audit also found that the organization lacked the 
independence required to meet international standards for an 
oversight institution . . . .‖26  Indeed as a young institution 
operating in very difficult circumstances, HOO has a long way to 
go.  In order to become an effective and independent institution, 
HOO will need strong financial and professional support from 
both national and international agencies in the years to come. 
Afghan anti-corruption initiatives do not seem to have had 
a noticeable impact on reducing corruption in the country, or on 
changing its perception among Afghan population.  The 2010 
Transparency International‘s Corruption Perception Index ranks 
Afghanistan, jointly with Myanmar, 176th out of 178 countries—
making it the second most corrupt country in the world.27  All of 
this would seem to indicate that the Afghan government has failed 
to implement its anti-corruption strategies and initiatives.  One of 
the main reasons for this failure is that the Afghan government has 
been very reluctant to take decisive actions against high ranking 
officials suspected or accused of corruption.  Corruption 
investigations against high-ranking government officials have been 
repeatedly blocked, and honest anti-corruption officials have been 
demoted or fired.  According to a New York Times report, on 
August 28, 2010 Fazel Ahmed Faqiryar—the former deputy 
attorney general of Afghanistan—was sacked after he repeatedly 
refused to block corruption investigations against high-ranking 
government officials.28  The article adds: 
[t]he dispute began last year, Mr. Faqiryar said, when he 
went before the Afghan Parliament and read aloud the 
names of at least 25 Afghan officials who were under 
investigation for corruption. The list included some of the 
most senior officials in Mr. Karzai‘s government, including 
Mohammed Siddiq Chakari, the former minister for hajj 
 
26 Id. at 109. 
27 TRANSPARENCY INT‘L, TRANSPARENCY INTERNATIONAL CORRUPTION 
PERCEPTIONS INDEX 2 (2010). 
28 Dexter Filkins & Alissa Rubin, Graft-Fighting Prosecutor Fired in Afghanistan, 
N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 28, 2010, http://www.nytimes.com/2010/08/29/world/ 
asia/29afghan.html. 
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and Islamic affairs, and Rangin Spanta, who is now the 
national security adviser.29 
Similarly, high-ranking officials within the justice and rule of law 
institutions are hardly ever investigated and/or sanctioned for 
corruption, although several dozen judges and other judicial 
officials have been punished for corruption recently.30  However, 
there is no evidence indicating that those who are punished 
include high-ranking judicial officials.31  This situation goes 
directly against a key principle of the idea of rule of law—
accountability of all citizens before the law, and the equal 
enforcement of laws.  The immunity of those with political power 
and money from accountability is likely to result in the persistence 
of corruption.  This indeed seems to be the case in Afghanistan 
today. 
As will be examined in the next section, persistent 
corruption within the state justice institutions has not only 
weakened trust in them, but has also driven many Afghans to take 
their disputes to the Taliban for resolution, where the Taliban 
courts are ―the only effective and trusted tribunals of justice.  Above 
all, unlike the state courts, ‗their decisions are not dependent on the 
ability to pay bribes and will be enforced.‖32  However, the Taliban‘s 
courts operate only in the areas that they control, or where they 
enjoy significant support.  In many other parts of the country, most 
Afghans continue to take their disputes to non-state local justice 
institutions for resolution.33  
3.  NON-STATE JUSTICE SYSTEM 
As mentioned in the previous discussion, the 
overwhelming majority of disputes in Afghanistan are resolved 
outside of the state justice system.  They are resolved by 
community or village-based local institutions and processes, which 
operate even less as a ―system‖ than the state justice ―system.‖  
Although these local institutions and processes may interact with 
state justice institutions in different contexts and to varying 
 
29 Id. 
30 CARTER & CLARK, supra note 14, at 32. 
31 Id. at 33. 
32 Frank Ledwidge, Justice and Counter Insurgency in Afghanistan: A Missing 
Link, 154 ROYAL UNITED SERVICES INST. J. 6, 7 (2009). 
33 Id. at 8. 
https://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/jil/vol32/iss5/5
WARDAK_FINAL.DOC (DO NOT DELETE) 10/20/2011  3:13 PM 
2011] JUSTICE SYSTEMS IN AFGHANISTAN 1315 
degrees, the interaction occurs outside of a regulated framework.34  
The most important non-state institutions in Afghanistan are jirga 
and shura.  The particular form and composition of a jirga or shura 
are determined by the nature of a dispute at hand, but typically by 
a body of respected marakachian or rishsafidan (local elders and 
leaders) who refer to customary laws in order to reach a settlement 
that is acceptable to disputants and to the community.  Jirga and 
shura address issues ranging from minor bodily harm and 
agricultural land boundaries to serious and sometimes violent 
conflicts concerning communal lands and murder. 
Jirgas and shuras place strong emphasis on reconciliation 
and making peace among disputants.  Thus, unlike the state justice 
system, which creates losers and winners, jirgas and shuras reach 
community-led decisions that promote restorative justice (as 
opposed to retributive justice), and help to restore peace and 
dignity among the victims, offenders, and the community.35  These 
local Afghan institutions also aim to reintegrate offenders back into 
the community after holding them accountable for a wrongdoing.36  
As a form of alternative dispute resolution, these practices can also 
reduce strain on a capacity-deficient state justice system.37  In 
addition, jirgas and shuras are shown to be more accessible, more 
efficient (in terms of time and money), perceived as less corrupt, 
and more trusted by Afghans compared to formal state courts.38  A 
more recent national survey by the Asia Foundation strongly 
confirms these findings.39  Figure 3, below, compares respondents‘ 
perceptions of state courts and local shura and jirga with regard to 
five key issues. 
 
34 NOAH COBURN & JOHN DEMPSEY, U.S. INST. OF PEACE, INFORMAL DISPUTE 
RESOLUTION IN AFGHANISTAN 3–4 (2010), available at http://www.usip.org/files/ 
resources/sr247_0.pdf.  See generally AFG. RES. AND EVALUATION UNIT (AREU), 
COMMUNITY-BASED DISPUTE RESOLUTION PROCESSES IN NANGARHAR PROVINCE 
(2009), available at http://www.unhcr.org/refworld/docid/4b3870cf2.html 
[hereinafter COMMUNITY-BASED DISPUTE RESOLUTION PROCESSES] (discussing 
community-based dispute resolution in Afghanistan). 
35 COBURN & DEMPSEY, supra note 34, at 3; see also AFGHANISTAN HUMAN 
DEVELOPMENT REPORT, supra note 8, at 10. 
36 COBURN & DEMPSEY, supra note 34, at 3. 
37 Id. at 2–3. 
38 Id. at 2; see, e.g., ASIA FOUND., AFGHANISTAN IN 2010: A SURVEY OF THE 
AFGHAN PEOPLE 134 (2010), available at http://asiafoundation.org/resources/ 
pdfs/Afghanistanin2010survey.pdf [hereinafter ASIA FOUNDATION]; see also Wardak, 
supra note 1. 
39 ASIA FOUNDATION, supra note 38, at 134. 
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FIGURE 3: PERCEPTIONS OF THE STATE AND NON-STATE JUSTICE 
SYSTEMS: PERCENTAGE OF RESPONDENTS WHO AGREE (STRONGLY 
AGREE AND SOMEWHAT AGREE) WITH FIVE STATEMENTS RELATED TO 
STATE COURTS AND JIRGA AND SHURA40 
 
Figure 3, above, illustrates that jirga and shura are 
perceived by respondents to be performing better than State 
justice institutions.  These non-state institutions are shown to be 
more accessible, more trusted, in accord with accepted local 
norms, more effective, less corrupt, and more prompt in the 
resolution of disputes than state courts.  These results would seem 
to indicate that most Afghans continue to perceive non-state justice 
institutions more positively than state courts.  However, male 
elders (rishsafidan/marakachian) usually dominate gatherings of 
jirgas and shuras, and women are largely excluded from 
participation in the decision-making of these bodies as Figure 4, 
below illustrates. 
 
 
 
40 Id. 
Strongly Agree and  
Somewhat Agree 
State Courts 
(%) 
Jirgas and 
Shuras (%) 
Are accessible to me 73 86 
Are fair and trusted 53 73 
Follow the local norms and values 
of our people 
51 70 
Are effective at delivering justice 54 69 
Resolve cases timely and promptly 42 66 
https://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/jil/vol32/iss5/5
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FIGURE 4: REPRESENTATION AT LOCAL JIRGAS AND SHURAS41 
 
As Figure 4, above, illustrates, two-thirds of respondents 
said that ordinary elders (rishsafidan) were always represented on 
the jirga or shura, and another quarter said that they were 
sometimes represented.  One-third of the individuals surveyed 
said that mullahs were always represented, and more than a third 
said that they were sometimes represented.  There was a similar 
response regarding local leaders (Khan or Malik).  Commanders 
were much less likely to be represented on local jirgas or shuras. 
More importantly, these data indicate that women had the least 
representation in jirgas and shuras: only eight percent of the 
respondents said that women were always or sometimes 
represented in jirgas or shuras.  This confirms—as in most other 
spheres of life in Afghan society—that women are largely excluded 
from the structure and processes of jirgas and suhras. This situation 
not only has serious implications for gender equality within these 
 
41 For a partial representation of this data, see AFGHANISTAN HUMAN 
DEVELOPMENT REPORT, supra note 8, at 98–99 (2007).  The Centre for Policy and 
Human Development survey was commissioned by the UNDP-supported Centre 
for Policy and Human Development (―CPHD‖), at Kabul University, and was 
carried out by ACSOR in February 2007.  The survey‘s sample consisted of 2339 
men and women, which covered thirty-two out of Afghanistan‘s thirty-four 
provinces.  The full dataset from this survey is on file with the second author, to 
whom any questions can be directed. 
How frequently are people from various community groups present at a village- or 
neighbourhood-based Jirga or Shura?  
(Values given in percentages based on a sample size of 2339 individuals) 
 Always Sometimes Rarely Never Don‘t Know Refused 
Ordinary 
elders 
(Rishsafidan) 
 
65 
 
25 
 
7 
 
3 
 
1 
 
* 
Mullahs 36 43 15 6 1 * 
Local leaders 
(Khan or 
Malik) 
 
31 
 
36 
 
22 
 
9 
 
2 
 
* 
Commanders 12 25 34 26 3 1 
Women 2 6 21 67 3 1 
Other  2 3 5 9 81 1 
Published by Penn Law: Legal Scholarship Repository, 2014
WARDAK_FINAL.DOC (DO NOT DELETE) 10/20/2011  3:13 PM 
1318 U. Pa. J. Int’l L. [Vol. 32:5 
local institutions of dispute settlement, but for the actual delivery 
of justice to women at a local level. 
Another serious problem is that some settlements made by 
jirgas and shuras may include baad—the practice of offering a 
woman into marriage as a means of dispute settlement.  This 
practice violates Afghan state laws, shari’a, and fundamental 
human rights.42  Although recent field studies reveal that the 
practice of baad is increasingly rare, even among Pashtuns in 
eastern Afghanistan,43 its mere occurrence has serious implications 
for the human rights of women in Afghan society, and for their 
fundamental freedoms.  However, it is important to recognize that 
baad and the exclusion of women from participation in jirgas and 
shuras are not inherent characteristics of these non-state justice 
institutions; they are the characteristics of Afghan patriarchal 
society.  According to a recent field study: 
[w]omen‘s access to these [community-based dispute 
resolution] processes and participation in them is 
constrained and at times decisions are made which do not 
uphold women‘s human rights.  However, this is not an 
outcome of community-based dispute resolution or 
customary law itself, but is instead a consequence of 
prevailing gender roles and relations in Afghanistan more 
widely.44 
Indeed, women‘s rights are widely violated in Afghan society, and 
the state justice system does not fare better than non-state justice 
institutions.45  Furthermore, it is important to point out that 
 
42 See generally AFGHANISTAN HUMAN DEVELOPMENT REPORT, supra note 8 
(exploring the importance of rule of law to human development); Ali Wardak, 
Jirga: Power and Traditional Conflict Resolution in Afghanistan, in LAW AFTER GROUND 
ZERO 187–204 (John Strawson ed. 2002) (exploring the institution of jirga as a 
traditional mechanism of conflict resolution in Afghanistan); Ali Wardak, 
Structures of Authority and Local Dispute Settlement in Afghanistan, in CONFLICTS AND 
CONFLICT RESOLUTION IN MIDDLE EASTERN SOCIETIES: BETWEEN TRADITION AND 
MODERNITY 347–70 (Hans-Jörg Albrecht et al. eds., 2006) (discussing structures of 
authority and local dispute settlement in Afghanistan); Wardak, supra note 1 
(examining sharia, jurga, the Afghan interim legal framework, and human rights 
principles). 
43 U.S. AGENCY FOR INT‘L DEV., AFGHANISTAN RULE OF LAW STABILIZATION 
PROGRAM ASSESSMENT (INFORMAL COMPONENT) 21 (2011); see also COMMUNITY-
BASED DISPUTE RESOLUTION PROCESSES, supra note 34. 
44 COMMUNITY-BASED DISPUTE RESOLUTION PROCESSES, supra note 34, at 4. 
45 CTR. FOR INT‘L GOVERNANCE INNOVATION, 4 THE SECURITY SECTOR REFORM 
MONITOR: AFGHANISTAN 6–7 (2010), available at 
https://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/jil/vol32/iss5/5
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women‘s access to the state justice system, where approximately 
three percent of the judges,46 and less than once percent of police 
personnel are women, 47 is severely limited.  Another problem 
with non-state justice institutions according to some studies is that 
in some parts of Afghanistan jirgas and shuras are influenced by 
local strong men and warlords, and, therefore, may produce 
biased and unfair outcomes.48  However, other studies indicate 
that because many local strong men and warlords have been 
appointed to key government positions in recent years, their 
influence over jirgas and shuras has significantly been reduced in 
rural areas.49  Nevertheless, like the state justice institutions, jirgas 
and shuras also have serious problems in resolving local disputes 
transparently.  These problems need to be addressed in 
imaginative and prudent ways. 
4. THE NEED FOR SYNERGY 
What has been examined in the previous two sections of this 
paper indicates that both state and non-state justice ―systems‖ in 
Afghanistan have serious problems in delivering justice to the 
Afghan people.  This examination indicates that Afghanistan needs 
a new coherent ―Afghan‖ vision for re-building a post-Taliban 
justice system—a vision that is deeply rooted in Afghan culture 
and society, and is capable of meeting the new complex needs of 
the Afghan population effectively, cost-effectively, and in humane 
ways.  The new vision should be capable of envisaging a 
sustainable justice system that bridges Afghan cultural and 
religious values into modern ideas about justice and its delivery in 
post-Taliban Afghanistan.  Such a vision—in terms of a meaningful 
synergy between state and non-state justice—is proposed by the 
2007 UNDP-supported Afghanistan Human Development 
Report.50  This vision is formulated in the form of a ―hybrid model 
for Afghan justice,‖ which is illustrated in Figure 5, below. 
 
http://www.humansecuritygateway.com/documents/CIGI-SSR-Afghanistan-
September2010.pdf. 
46 AFGHANISTAN HUMAN DEVELOPMENT REPORT, supra note 8, at 71. 
47 Id. at 83. 
48 FEINSTEIN INT‘L FAMINE CTR., TUFTS UNIV., HUMAN SECURITY AND LIVELIHOOD 
OF RURAL AFGHANS (2002–2003) 7 (2004), available at 
http://www.cmi.no/pdf/?file=/afghanistan/doc/Mazurana2.pdf. 
49 AFGHANISTAN HUMAN DEVELOPMENT REPORT, supra note 8, at 97–98. 
50 See generally AFGHANISTAN HUMAN DEVELOPMENT REPORT, supra note 8, at 71 
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FIGURE 5: HYBRID MODEL FOR AFGHAN JUSTICE51 
 
The ―hybrid model‖ proposes the creation of Alternative 
Dispute Resolution (―ADR‖) and Human Rights Units alongside 
the state justice system at the district level.  The model envisages 
that the ADR Unit would be responsible for selecting appropriate 
mechanisms to settle disputes outside the courtroom.  This would 
mainly include jirga and shura, but also other appropriate civil 
society organizations such as Community Development Councils 
(―CDCs‖) that have been established by the Afghan government‘s 
National Solidarity Programme in recent years.  ADR mechanisms 
would handle minor criminal offenses52 and civil cases, while 
 
(proposing a hybrid model of formal and informal justice). 
51 Id. at 129. 
52 The existing Penal Code of Afghanistan categorizes Ta’zeer offences 
(acts/omissions that are prohibited in Islam, but for which specific punishments 
are not prescribed under hadd or qisas and diyah) into: jenaiat (felonies), jonha 
(misdemeanors) and qabahat (obscenity).  It is the first category of offenses—
punished by death or long imprisonments—that are considered as serious crimes.  
Most of the other categories are considered less serious offenses. 
https://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/jil/vol32/iss5/5
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giving people a choice to have their cases heard at the nearest state 
court.  All serious criminal cases, on the other hand, would fall 
exclusively within the jurisdiction of the state justice system. 
According to the ―hybrid model,‖ the proposed Human 
Rights Unit would be staffed by officials from the Afghanistan 
Independent Human Rights Commission (―AIHRC‖),53 or from 
other Human Rights and Civil Society bodies in Afghanistan.  In 
order to counterbalance the dominance of men in jirga and shura 
within the ADR Unit, the Human Rights Unit would be staffed by 
female personnel to the extent feasible.  The Human Rights Unit 
would be mandated to monitor decisions made by ADR bodies in 
order to ensure their consistency with human rights principles.  
The Human Rights Unit would also carry out educational and 
training activities, and would examine domestic violence, past 
human rights abuses, and war crimes. 
In addition to the approval of ADR decisions by the 
proposed Human Rights Unit, ADR decisions would also need to 
be approved by the district state court, or by a concerned mahkama-
e-shahri (urban court) in Afghan cities.  This is to ensure that ADR 
decisions do not violate Afghan legal norms and/or the 
fundamental principles of Islamic Shari’a.  The model proposes that 
when ADR decisions fail to be approved by either the Human 
Rights Unit or the concerned state court, they would need to be 
revised or referred to the state justice system for processing and 
adjudication.  Also, when ADR decisions are not satisfactory to one 
or both disputants, they can be taken back to the formal state 
justice system for processing and adjudication.  It is important to 
mention that the ―hybrid model‖ does not specify the actual 
―mechanics‖ of the interactions between the ADR Unit, Human 
Rights Unit, and the state court, as these are to be decided in 
accordance with the nature and the circumstances of a specific 
dispute.  This interaction may be conducted through formal 
correspondence, through the participation of representatives from 
the Human Rights Unit and the state court in the final decision 
making session of the ADR Unit, or through other innovative 
ways. 
 
53 Afghanistan Independent Human Rights Commission (―AIHRC‖) has 
regional offices throughout the country.  Through its ―Monitoring and 
Investigation Unit,‖ the Commission receives and investigates human rights 
violation complaints from the people of Afghanistan. 
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The ―hybrid model,‖ which reflects deeply-held Afghan 
moral and cultural values as well as most recent thoughts about 
contemporary criminology and criminal justice (restorative justice), 
provides a coherent framework for the delivery of effective, cost 
effective, accessible, and speedy justice to the Afghan people.  As 
an innovative formula synergising state and non-state justice 
institutions, the model envisages an Afghan justice system that is 
less bureaucratic, and therefore, less corruptible.  Moreover, since 
it is deeply rooted in Afghan culture and society, the ―hybrid 
model‖ promises the establishment of a sustainable justice system 
that is central to the ―Afghanisation‖ of rebuilding Afghan state 
institutions.  Despite an angry and threatening response from 
Afghan judicial and state justice institutions, and the opposition of 
some Afghan women and human rights organizations to the 
hybrid model, it has created an important debate among Afghan 
and international circles concerned with justice-related issues in 
Afghanistan.  However, opposition from some influential Afghan 
circles had resulted in a slowing down of government policy 
responses to the recommendations of the 2007 Afghanistan Human 
Development Report and to its proposed ―hybrid model of Afghan 
justice.‖ 
Although the Afghan government signalled its willingness 
to engage with traditional justice in the Afghanistan 
National Development Strategy of 2008, and again at the 
London Conference in early 2010, pressure from the human 
rights community and some members of Afghanistan‘s 
legal establishment has slowed efforts to codify a clearly 
defined relationship between formal and traditional systems 
into Afghan law.54 
The unhelpful response of Afghanistan‘s legal establishment in 
terms of its perceived vested interests in the existing justice system 
may be understandable.  Opposition from some Afghan women 
and human rights organisations—including the AIHRC—to the 
―hybrid model‖ is not fully comprehensible.  One of the key aims 
of the ―hybrid model‖ is the reform of jirga and shura.  As 
mentioned earlier, a key proposal of the model is that the decision 
made by jirga and shura would only have formally binding effects, 
 
54 CTR. FOR INT‘L GOVERNANCE INNOVATION, supra note 45, at 11. 
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when they are in line with human right principles, Islamic shari’a 
and Afghan laws. 
Nevertheless, in recognition of the importance of 
synergizing state and non-state justice systems, the Afghan 
Ministry of Justice—with the help of the United States Institute of 
Peace (―USIP‖)—drafted a National Policy on Relations Between the 
Formal Justice System and Dispute Resolution Councils.  The draft 
Policy, which was subjected to weekly discussions by a complex 
―working group‖ for a very long time, is now drafted as The Law on 
Dispute Resolution, Shuras and Jigras, by the Ministry of Justice.55  
However, the draft law, in its current form, severely limits the 
scope of non-state justice institutions and overregulates them. 
Moreover, it imposes unrealistic restrictions on jirga/shura 
membership and criminalizes non-compliance with provisions of 
this law.  All these have huge negative implications for the 
flexibility, accessibility, local ownership and the ―restorative‖ 
characteristics of non-state justice institutions.  The draft law needs 
to be debated openly and objectively; it needs to be discussed in 
the framework of the original logic of the ―hybrid model,‖ and in 
the light of the results of recent empirical research. It is important 
to mention that the ideas derived from the ―hybrid model‖ have 
been piloted in some parts of Afghanistan.  Preliminary results of 
the pilot studies in selected districts in Afghanistan indicate that 
the ―hybrid model‖ (or the ideas derived from it) provides 
workable solutions to most of the problems that Afghan state and 
non-state justice systems currently face.56 
5. CONCLUSION 
This Article focused on a brief examination of national and 
international efforts to rebuild the justice system in post-Taliban 
Afghanistan.  As indicated in the Article, progress in the process of 
 
55 See Abdul Qadir Siddique, Informal Justice System to Have Legal Cover, 
PAJHWOK AFGAN NEWS, Oct. 25, 2010, http://www.pajhwok.com/en/2010 
/10/25/informal-justice-system-have-legal-cover. 
56 See generally Ali Wardak, A Field Assessment: Linking Formal and 
Informal Customary Justice Mechanisms in Ahmad Aba (Paktia) and Zone 5 of 
Jalalabad: An Exploratory Project (2010) (unpublished report) (on file with author) 
(commenting on a study which demonstrated the strengths and weaknesses of a 
collaboration between the informal and formal sectors in Afghanistan); U.S. 
AGENCY FOR INT‘L DEV., supra note 43 (documenting the success of a study which 
sought to increase stability in targeted areas of Afghanistan through 
strengthening the ability of Community-Based Dispute Resolution mechanisms). 
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rebuilding Afghan judicial institutions has been slow, patchy and 
problematic.  The lack of effective coordination among national 
justice institutions, and between national and international actors, 
lack of a coherent ―Afghan‖ vision, and the focus on reviving the 
old (pre-civil war) justice system with some patchy ―legal 
engineering‖ seem to be the main contributing factors.  
Furthermore, endemic corruption, high levels of professional 
incompetence, inadequacy of detention/correctional facilities, and, 
more importantly, a very low level of public trust in the state 
justice system continue to pose serious problems in the rebuilding 
of judicial institutions in Afghanistan.  Thus, the overwhelming 
majority of the Afghan population continues to take their disputes 
to non-state justice institutions—jirga and shura—for resolution.  
Drawing on the 2007 Afghanistan Human Development Report and on 
its proposed ―hybrid model,‖ it is maintained that creating a 
meaningful synergy between state and non-state justice and civil 
society institutions within a coherent framework could provide 
effective, cost-effective, accessible and restorative justice to the 
Afghan population.  Empirical evidence based on recent pilot 
studies has confirmed this. This could, in turn, strengthen the 
Afghan population‘s trust in its justice system and in the current 
national and international efforts to stabilize Afghanistan. 
 
https://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/jil/vol32/iss5/5
